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How Not to Process Stateless 
Enemies: A Review of Andrew 
McCarthy’s Willful Blindness: A 
Memoir of the Jihad 
 
Timothy P. Connors* 
 
Over eight years after the September 11th attacks, Al 
Qaeda remains a viable enemy intent on attacking the United 
States.  As the Obama Administration’s Director of National 
Intelligence, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, testified before the 
Senate in February 2009,  
 
Under the strategic direction of Usama Bin 
Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-
Qa’ida remains intent on attacking US interests 
worldwide, including the US Homeland. . . . Al-
Qa’ida leaders still use the [Pakistan] tribal 
areas as a base from which they can avoid 
capture, produce propaganda, communicate with 
operational cells abroad, and provide training 
and indoctrination to new terrorist operatives.1 
 
Admiral Blair and others have characterized al Qaeda as a 
stateless enemy, which consists of loosely affiliated networks, 
operates from remote areas, and achieves global reach through 
the tools of the Information Age.2  It is a threat that is unique 
to the 21st century, and therefore does not fit neatly into the 
systems we have constructed to deal with the threats of the last 
 
* Timothy Connors is a partner at PJ Sage, Inc., a security firm that 
advises clients on 21st century threats.  He is a graduate of Notre Dame Law 
School and a member of the New York State Bar. 
1. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 111TH CONG., ANNUAL THREAT 
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 6 (Feb. 12, 2009) (statement for 
the record of Admiral Dennis C. Blair), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf. 
2. See, e.g., id. at 38-41. 
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century (e.g., the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. criminal 
justice system).  What, for example, do we do with individual 
members of al Qaeda who we detain on a global battlefield?  
Each of the models built in the 20th century—criminal trials 
and military tribunals—has its share of deficiencies, which are 
evident in the raucous political discourse surrounding 
Guantanamo Bay. 
That debate has become even more heated, as the Obama 
Administration moved to bring 9-11 mastermind Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed (“KSM”) to New York City for trial.3  In 
announcing the decision, Attorney General Eric Holder cited a 
need to bring Guantanamo detainees to justice and expressed 
confidence in the U.S. criminal justice system’s ability to 
handle these trials.4  New York Congressman Jerrold Nadler 
echoed this reasoning, calling “[a]ny suggestion that our 
prosecutors and our law enforcement personnel are not up to 
the task of safely holding and successfully prosecuting 
terrorists on American soil . . . insulting and untrue.”5  If only 
the issues surrounding this decision were that simple.  In fact, 
it is a testament to the complexity of the problem that the 
Administration also decided to both use military tribunals in 
some cases and to detain enemy combatants indefinitely.6  And 
despite continuing these long-held policy decisions of the Bush 
Administration, as well as disparaging that Administration’s 
policies for many years, the Attorney General was unable to 
articulate with confidence what some of the second and third 
order implications of the KSM decision would be.7 
Holder’s decision, and apparent unwillingness to consider 
the downside of that decision, should come as no surprise from 
an Administration that has expressed a near absolute 
 
3. Charlie Savage, U.S. to try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian 




7. Posting of Frank James to The Two Way: NPR’s News Blog, Would 
U.S. Need To Read Bin Laden His Miranda Rights?,  
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/11/would_us_need_to_read_ 
bin_lade.html (Nov. 18, 2009 14:26 EST) (describing Senator Lindsey 
Graham’s questioning of the Attorney General during Congressional hearings 
regarding his decision to try KSM in New York). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/24
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preference for criminal trials of terrorists in civilian courts.  In 
a speech on national security delivered last May, President 
Obama clearly expressed such policy guidance.  While it is 
inconclusive how he might handle future detainees, President 
Obama indicated a strong preference for using our federal 
criminal justice system as the primary option: 
 
First, whenever feasible, we will try those who 
have violated American criminal laws in federal 
courts—courts provided for by the United States 
Constitution. Some have derided our federal 
courts as incapable of handling the trials of 
terrorists. They are wrong. Our courts and our 
juries, our citizens, are tough enough to convict 
terrorists.8 
 
Andrew McCarthy disagrees with the President’s assertion 
in his book Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad,9 which 
describes McCarthy’s experience prosecuting the terrorists 
behind the Landmarks Plot.10  He bears listening to, as there 
are few prosecutors with the same extensive experience, which 
he has earned while in the arena of a courtroom prosecuting 
hardened terrorists.  McCarthy pulls no punches in criticizing 
the practice of treating “alien security threats as if they were 
legal issues to be spotted and adjudicated rather than enemies 
to be smoked out and defeated before they can kill.”11  In 
making his case, McCarthy exhibits a healthy disrespect for 
the use of courts and lawyers as the best instruments for 
resolving all of life’s problems. 
The terrorists he confronted certainly hardened his 
convictions as to the best way for dealing with them.  The Blind 
 
8. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National 
Security, (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-
National-Security-5-21-09/. 
9. ANDREW MCCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE JIHAD 
(2008). 
10. See id. at 231-44, 255-64 (describing the planning and investigation 
of the Landmarks Plot, a failed terrorist attack on landmarks across New 
York City). 
11. Id. at 12. 
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Sheikh, Omar Adbel Rahman, was the spiritual leader of the 
cell responsible for the Landmarks Plot.12  Originally from 
Egypt, he was educated at al-Azhar University in Cairo, where 
he earned a doctorate in Qur’anic studies.13  He was a true 
believer and crafty promoter of the ideology behind al Qaeda: 
“Freedom” from what holds Muslims back can only be achieved 
through submission to Allah and his religion, and Muslims 
have an individual duty to impose Islam through violent 
jihad.14 
The Blind Sheikh gathered a following of foot soldiers and 
more able jihadists in New York City circa 1990.15  Inspired by 
Rahman, and plugged into a nascent global network spawned 
in Afghanistan, this cell turned its attention toward attacking 
the “head of the snake” in the United States.16  In 1993, they 
successfully detonated a truck bomb in the parking garage at 
the World Trade Center.17  This event was entirely 
preventable, but for the risk averse culture in the FBI, which 
had parted ways with Emad Salem, an informant inside the 
cell, a few months before the attack.18  What is more, after 
arresting and convicting Sayyid Nosair, a leading member of 
the cell, for the 1990 murder of Meir Kahane in New York City, 
the FBI seized a treasure trove of evidence it did nothing to 
exploit.19 
Ultimately, the cell survived the trials for the murder of 
Kahane and the 1993 bombing, and it continued to plot grand 
plans of attacking multiple New York landmarks.  This time, 
the FBI and the prosecutors were able to prevent an attack and 
put the offenders behind bars.20  While this was certainly a 
triumph of the American criminal justice system (something 
the President and all Americans are rightfully proud of), the 
arduous, drawn-out process carried with it many negative 
implications.  First and foremost, the system was strained to 
 
12. Id. at 231-44. 
13. Id. at 241. 
14. Id. at 36-37. 
15. Id. at 9. 
16. Id. at 77. 
17. Id. at 189. 
18. Id. at 169-75. 
19. Id. at 130-33. 
20. Id. at 294. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/24
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the maximum in dealing with approximately one dozen 
members of this one cell in New York.  As McCarthy points out, 
 
[e]ven with the highest conceivable conviction 
rate of 100 percent, less than three dozen 
terrorists were neutralized [during the eight 
years between the bombing and the destruction 
of the Twin Towers]—at a cost that was 
staggering and that continues to be paid, as 
several of these cases remain, all these years 
later, in appellate or habeas-corpus litigation.21 
 
The limitation signaled in these results is not comforting given 
the global scope of al Qaeda and its allies. 
Another negative aspect of the system according to 
McCarthy is that it is risk averse.  Not only did law 
enforcement investigators dismiss a valuable confidential 
informant before the 1993 bombings and ignore evidence from 
the Nosair case, truth be told, the FBI was monitoring this cell 
in the late 1980s.22  Yet, when the budding jihadists discovered 
that the FBI was conducting surveillance on them as they 
trained with automatic weapons, they raised a claim of 
religious persecution.23  It was enough to cause the FBI, 
concerned with accusations that it was violating a person’s civil 
rights, to end the surveillance.24 
To be sure, law enforcement is not the only risk averse 
element of the criminal justice system.  Judges, afraid of 
reversals, tend to deliver rulings that they are confident will 
not be overturned.25  For example, when ruling on discovery 
motions, judges naturally tend to favor disclosure of 
information to the defense.26  Prosecutors also tend to disclose 
more materials to defense attorneys than is required in order 
to avoid reversal and retrial in the future.27  The reams of 
 
21. Id. at 310 (emphasis omitted). 
22. Id. at 87. 
23. Id. at 89-90. 
24. Id. at 90. 
25. Id. at 311. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 310-11. 
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information that become public during the course of a terrorism 
trial should give pause for concern.  McCarthy points out, for 
example, that Ali Mohammed, an associate of Osama bin 
Laden, obtained a list of names of about 200 unindicted co-
conspirators of the Landmarks Plot case and faxed it to bin 
Laden in Sudan.28  Not only can our own intelligence sources 
and methods be compromised during the disclosure process in a 
criminal trial, but those of our allies as well.  This presents a 
serious obstacle to the international information sharing that 
helps keep Americans safe at home.29 
The choice between proceeding with a prosecution and 
revealing state secrets in a criminal trial is a difficult one.  
McCarthy finds it troubling to cede such choices on a wholesale 
basis to lawyers and judges, as opposed to executive branch 
officials charged with keeping the public safe from harm.30 
 
Sometimes, [the criminal justice process is] an 
illusion.  Sometimes there is a bigger picture 
that is obscured.  The legal system’s job is not to 
produce the definitive version of history.  It is to 
produce a judgment about the provenance of 
facts the government chooses to put in dispute by 
leveling accusations.31 
 
As such, the criminal justice system is limited in scope in a way 
that often makes it deficient in fighting terrorism. 
Criminal process, organizational cultures, and intelligence 
disclosures aside, perhaps what McCarthy finds the most 
troubling is that, in his view, the jihadists he prosecuted were 
emboldened by the process.  There was a sense that the 
American criminal justice system was feckless, which 
encouraged many terrorists to believe that Allah favored their 
endeavors with His protection.  For example, McCarthy cites 
the joyous courtroom celebration when a jury acquitted Sayyid 
Nosair of Kahane’s murder.  In a war, it borders on 
 
28. Id. at 305. 
29. Id. at 312-13. 
30. Id. at 311. 
31. Id. at 23. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/24
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recklessness to embolden one’s enemies.  Yet, McCarthy 
argues, even in a successful trial where a conviction is achieved 
and sustained, that is exactly what occurs.32 
McCarthy also spares no punches for the radical belief 
system that he sees as a robust minority within Islam.  He 
argues, “Islam is a dangerous creed.  It rejects core aspects of 
Western liberalism: self-determination, freedom of choice, 
freedom of conscience, equality under the law.”33  He cites 
numerous examples where Islamic authorities promote views 
that are hateful and run counter to establishing peaceful 
relations with non-Muslims.34  He also rails against Western 
apologists who are blinded to, or rationalize away, these 
realities.35  He argues that “[i]t is simply delusional to think 
that there is no correlation between what a person believes and 
how he is likely to act—as delusional as it is to think there is 
no correlation between Islam’s doctrinal summons to violence 
and Islamic terrorism.”36 
This second part of McCarthy’s thesis in Willful Blindness 
fails to address the tension policymakers face between rejecting 
ideas that encourage violence and not being perceived by the 
broader mass of Muslims as attacking their religion.  There are 
good reasons for policymakers to be cautious when talking 
about religious concepts, reasons which do not necessarily 
make them apologists.  The ultimate objective should be to 
isolate the extremists (whether that is a mere handful or, as 
McCarthy argues, a much larger minority) within their own 
religion.  That is a heavy, and perhaps impossible, lift for a 
Western policymaker.  Rather, it may be wiser to follow 
General David Petraeus’ rule in fighting the counterinsurgency 
 
32. Id. at 154-56.  Although Nosair was acquitted on the murder charge, 
he was convicted on charges of gun possession, assault, and coercion.  The 
trial judge believed that the jury’s decision to acquit Nosair of murder “was 
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was devoid of common 
sense and logic,” and he ultimately sentenced Nosair to the maximum term 
for each conviction.  Ronald Sullivan, Judge Gives Maximum Term in Kahane 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at A1 (quoting New York State Supreme 
Court Justice Alvin Schlesinger). 
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 316. 
34. Id. at 316-17. 
35. See, e.g., id. at 28-34 (McCarthy’s rebuttal of terrorism expert Dr. 
Marc Sageman). 
36. Id. at 178. 
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in Iraq: Do no harm.37 
McCarthy comes to his conclusions about Islam honestly.  
During the trial, he saw many Muslim witnesses demure to the 
Blind Sheikh when matters of religious doctrine were 
introduced.  According to McCarthy, 
 
[t]his made not a bit of difference to the trial—
Abdel Rahman had incontestably called for 
brutal strikes so many times that it was 
irrelevant whether these apparently nice people 
had gotten the word.  What was jarring, 
however, was that they were nice people and yet 
they were ready to defer, on matters of 
importance in their faith, to the homicidal 
maniac sitting in the corner of our courtroom.38 
 
In the grand scheme, it is worth remembering that keeping 
those nice people nice may often dictate how, or whether, 
government officials confront the rhetoric of the Blind Sheikhs 
of the world—perhaps a hard reality to accept for a battle-
scarred prosecutor. 
Willful Blindness is a well-written and entertaining 
criticism of the criminal justice model of fighting a global 
terrorist organization.  As we continue to debate policy on 
Guantanamo detainees, we should be mindful of how we deal 
with other 21st century threats.  For example, on our southern 
border, a future conflict with drug cartels is brewing.  These 
stateless actors do not shy away from extreme violence, and it 
is not inconceivable that the problems that they will create will 
grow beyond the managing capacity of our criminal justice 
system.  In considering how we will deal with the al Qaedas of 
the world, policymakers will do well to consider the lessons 
that McCarthy learned.  He was there at the beginning. 
 
 
37. See, e.g., Cullen Nutt, Opinion, Petraeus’ “Big Tent”, STAR LEDGER, 
Mar. 2, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4162911 (WestLaw). 
38. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 316. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/24
